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President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities
by Charles A. Beard

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24, ask the Japanese consul in Hawaii to report all vessels in each of five listed subareas of Pearl Harbor, and all warships and aircraft carriers "at anchor, tied up at wharves, buoys, and in the docks"? The trouble seems to have been that in all quarters the conclusion had been reached that the attack would come in the Asiatic theater, not at Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt, as even his worst detractors must know, was not plotting to help the Japanese score a victory at Pearl Harbor, although, like Lincoln before Sumter, he was determined that the United States must not strike the first blow. Roosevelt was merely as blind as his army and navy and civilian advisers, no more so. They had considered fully the possibilities of an attack on Pearl Harbor and had made up their minds that Japan could not and would not attempt it. The war was scheduled to start somewhere else.

Are there lessons in what happened at Pearl Harbor for the United States today? Surely, surely this possibility cannot be overlooked. And Millis has done a great service in showing us how utterly blind the best of us can be.

JOHN D. HICKS

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President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities. By CHARLES A. BEARD. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948. vi + 614 pp. \$5.00)

Charles A. Beard calls this volume a sequel to his *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940*, published in 1946. In it he continues the general method, point of view, and apparent objective of the earlier installment.

The present work is divided into three parts and an epilogue. Part I, "Appearances," presents an analysis of the Lend-Lease policy of the United States, the acquisition of bases in Greenland and Iceland, American naval patrolling in the Atlantic, and events leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Part II, "Unveiling Realities," considers data presented at some of the earlier investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack; and Part III, "Realities as Described by the Pearl Harbor Documents," continues the same general subject. In the epilogue, Beard estimates the consequences of the policies he has stated and interpreted.

A large part of the account, probably the greater part, consists of selected quotations from speeches in and out of Congress, excerpts from newspapers and books, press releases, Congressional hearings and reports.

The materials marshaled show that official contemporary statements of events and policies during the year 1941 were often inconsistent and were frequently short of being frank and open in the sense of revealing all relevant information possessed by the government. They show also conflict of contemporary views on policies and discrepancies among later accounts.

No exception is entered here concerning whatever the materials reveal, and students of the subject should welcome Beard's probing criticism and keen analysis. Some students will feel, however, that important facts and considerations have been omitted and that many of Beard's inferences, oblique remarks, and conclusions are not justified by the data presented. He does not say, for example (pp. 506 ff.), that Secretary Hull's note to the Japanese of November 26, 1941, was an ultimatum, but he calls it "an ultimative notice" and implies through his organization of materials, manner of presentation, and previous handling of Japan's proposal to talk over Pacific problems "in a peaceful spirit" that Japan was peacefully disposed while the United States was bent on war and by "complicated moves" maneuvered Japan into firing the first shot. The total effect of Beard's presentation, and the one he apparently intends, is that the United States was the aggressor both in the Atlantic and Pacific and that somehow, contrary to the wishes of the American people and without their knowledge, this aggression was perpetrated upon the peaceful Axis nations. The result, moreover, of this aggression has been to elevate Russia to a world position of sinister power and to undermine the American Constitution.

This thesis is not history. It is not an inquiry into events and policies for the purpose of revealing and understanding them. It is a gloss and a tract. It does little credit to Beard's great reputation as a scholar, and its contribution in the sense of presenting a point of view must be weighed against its possible disservice to those who rely solely upon it for understanding the great events with which it deals.

In one of his illuminating discussions of the ancient Greeks, R. W. Livingstone remarks that progressive political decay had become manifest in Greece even before the end of the fourth century and that one evidence of this was the growth of "critical agnosticism." People were skeptical and found fault; they offered no solution for the problems that confronted them. Beard offers no solutions for the foreign problems that confronted the United States in 1941. He does not analyze the problems or examine possible solutions. He does not seek to understand the solu-

tions that were adopted. But he profoundly dislikes the policies of President Roosevelt.

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The Inca Concept of Sovereignty and the Spanish Administration in Peru. By CHARLES GIBSON. (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1948. 146 pp.)

Seldom does one find a thesis on the master's level which is so well written, so broad in scope, and so attentive to details as this one.

The author has faithfully consulted all the printed source materials and secondary accounts relating, on the one hand, to the governmental organization and customs of the Inca rulers of pre-conquest Peru, and on the other hand, to the colonial administration of the Spanish monarchs and their representatives in Peru. Particular attention is given to the work of Francisco de Toledo, the fifth viceroy of Peru (1569–1581), especially his efforts to fuse Indian and Spanish institutions for the purpose of bringing order to a disrupted and chaotic society. Sufficient detail of Toledo's procedures and legislation is given to warrant the author's conclusion that Toledo "successfully implemented the legislation through which the Spanish colonial government finally replaced the Inca class" (p. 115).

Much of the detailed material in this study is well known to Latin American historians. The value of the study does not lie in the details; rather it lies in the author's clear-cut analyses of the data and his ability to show in synthesis how religion, class stratification, governmental practices, and clever propaganda were successfully used to give sanctity, power, and absolute control to the Incas.

After minutely describing the highly centralized political organization of the Incas, the author shows in great detail the disruptive effects of the conquest on the native government, the absolute breakdown of the former control of population movements, and the chaotic condition of Indian society in general. The problems resulting from the overthrow of these controls are also highlighted. In addition, the study reveals how economic necessity, not theory, forced the Spaniards to revive many of the workable Inca practices, such as the native communication system with its roads, runners, and inns and the conservation of the llama herds.

An excellent and adequate discussion of the so-called Toledan and the Garcilassan schools of historiography is to be found in this work. With